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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHAR'S CARS. L.L.C.. a Utah limited liability
company, and JEFFREY D. BIRSCHBACH,
Appellants.
vs.
DtLOY ELDER and BRUCE RUTHERFORD,
Case No. 20030082-CA
Appellees.

APPELLANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND REPLY BRIEF

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
DID NOT ENTER INTO A NEW AGREEMENT THAT RESULTED IN
ELDER'S RELEASE FOR PARTNERSHIP DEBTS INCURRED PRIOR
TO AUGUST 31, 1998.
Many of the arguments in Elder's brief are directed to the contention that he was
released from liability for all debts of the Elder/Rutherford Partnership arising prior to his
leaving the business by virtue of a new agreement entered into among Elder, Rutherford,
and Birschbach. Elder contends that the new agreement arose when he withdrew from the

business at the end of August, 1998. At trial, Elder argued for release or waiver on the
grounds of the common law doctrines of novation, accord and satisfaction, waiver, and
release. On appeal, Elder relies only on Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-33 and the doctrine of
novation. Elder did not rely on Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-33 at trial, and he should not be
permitted to do so for the first time on appeal.
Elder contends on appeal that the trial court found that there was such a new
agreement entered into, and contends that Birschbach fails to marshal the evidence to
overcome the court's finding. Elder's argument misinterprets the trial court's findings.
Contrary to Elder's arguments, the trial court expressly rejected his argument that a new
agreement was made that resulted in his release from Partnership debt. The trial court
found that there was a new agreement entered into when Elder left the business, but only
found that as a result of the new agreement Elder, would not be liable for debts incurred
by the dealership thereafter. The trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds
with respect to the release of Elder for debts that arose prior to his withdrawal from the
business.
Elder cannot sustain his burden to show that the trial court committed clear error
in finding that there was no agreement to release Elder for debts arising prior to his
withdrawal from the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. There is substantial evidence in he
record to support the trial court's finding, and Elder fails to marshal the evidence and
demonstrate that the evidence fails to support the finding.
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ELDER
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE
PARTNERSHIP'S DEBTS ARISING PRIOR TO ELDER'S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARTNERSHIP.
The trial court did conclude that Elder should be responsible for only one-half of
the Partnership debt arising prior to his withdrawal from the business. This conclusion
appears to be an error of law in that partners are liable for one hundred percent of
partnership obligations, not just the portion reflecting their ownership interest in the
partnership. In order to exhaust all possible grounds for the trial court's conclusion,
Birschbach has also addressed whether there is any evidence to support a partial-release
in favor of Elder. Elder did not argue for a partial-release at trial. The only conceivable
evidence to support a finding of partial-release is the facts related to the Garff Leasing
debt, and those facts cannot sustain such a finding.
C THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT ELDER
BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
Elder argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that he breached the
contract with Birschbach. He argues that the trial court erred because he had a legal
excuse, namely, he had been released from liability by virtue of a new agreement that
provided for his release from liability. This argument lacks merit because there was no
release for debts arising prior to Elder's withdrawal from the Partnership.
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT DAMAGES
WERE CAPABLE OF DETERMINATION.
Elder argues that the trial court awarded damages based upon speculative
evidence. Once liability has been determined, damages will not be denied because of

8537.02-10/14/03
americanunion\snarscars\appeal\replybrief

-3

some uncertainty in the calculations. The wrongdoer, not the aggrieved party, must
suffer the consequence of some uncertainty in damage calculations. The trial court had
evidence before it from various sources that calculated damages with alternative
methodologies.

The evidence included testimony from Elder's own expert witness.

There was more than adequate evidence to support an award of damages.
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING DAMAGES BASED
UPON THE PARTNERSHIP'S BALANCE SHEET DEFICIT.
The trial court awarded damages to Birschbach based upon the net balance sheet
deficit of the dealership at the time Elder left the business. This method of calculating
damages was inconsistent with the parties' contract and deprived Birschbach of the
benefit of his bargain. The contract required the Elder/Rutherford Partnership to pay the
expenses incurred in the operation of the business. Elder's own expert testified that the
outstanding debt when he left the business was $130,328.60, and the undisputed evidence
at trial showed that after shutting down the business only about two months later,
Birschbach was forced to pay expenses for the dealership of $220,000. In order to give
Birschbach the benefit of his bargain, the trial court should have awarded judgment in at
least the amount of $130,328.60.
F. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ELDER'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF BIRSCHBACH'S CASE IN
CHIEF.
Elder argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of Birschbach's case in chief. Elder asserts that the trial court
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should have granted the motion because Birschbach failed to present adequate evidence
of damages.
A party who moves for a directed verdict bears a very difficult burden. He must
show that no evidence exists that raises an issue of fact. The trial court must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and may not weigh evidence. At
trial Birschbach presented adequate evidence to support a finding of damages, and the
trial court properly denied Elder's motion to dismiss.
II. ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES
DID NOT ENTER INTO A NEW AGREEMENT THAT RESULTED IN
ELDER'S RELEASE FOR PARTNERSHIP DEBTS INCURRED PRIOR
TO AUGUST 31,1998.
In his brief. Elder argues that he was released from liability for debts of the
Elder/Rutherford Partnership pre-dating August 31, 1998 because of a new agreement
entered into among Birschbach, Elder, and Rutherford. He relies upon Utah Code Ann. §
48-1-33 to make this argument.

He argues that he determined to leave the

Elder/Rutherford Partnership in late August 1998, resulting in dissolution of the
Partnership. He further contends that the circumstances surrounding his departure from
the Partnership establish an agreement that Birschbach would release him from all
liability for the Partnership's obligations, including Partnership obligations pre-dating his
departure. In his brief, Elder outlines some of the evidence which he believes supports
his position, then concludes:
Birschbach fails to marshal the facts in support of the trial court's decision
that there was a new agreement consistent with Utah partnership law that
8537.02-10/14/03
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altered Elder's liability. The trial court should not be reversed on this
point.
(Elder's brief, p. 18.) Elder's assertions are incorrect for several reasons.
1. Elder may not rely upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-33 for the first time
on appeal.
On appeal Elder asserts, for the first time in this litigation, that Birschbach agreed
to release him under the standards set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-33. In order to
preserve an issue for appeal, "a party must timely bring the issue to the attention of the
trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits,"
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991.) In addition to presenting evidence to support the position, in order to
preserve an issue for appeal, a party must provide the trial court with 'legal authority" for
the position asserted. Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). At trial,
Elder failed even to reference UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-33 or any other related statutory
provisions. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 339-350.) Having failed to raise this issue at trial, Elder
cannot do so now.
2. Elder's argument assumes a mistaken interpretation of the trial
court's findings.
Elder argues that when he left the Partnership, he, Birschbach, and Rutherford
entered into a new agreement releasing him from liability for the debts existing when he
withdrew. Before the trial court, Elder made this argument based upon various common
law principles, and never raised the question of release under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-33.
In his appellate brief, Elder bases his release argument upon the assertion that the trial

8537 02-10/14/03
amencanunion\sharscars\appeal\replybnef

-6-

court found that there was a new agreement among Birschbach. Elder and Rutherford
resulting in the release of Elder for partnership obligations predating August 31, 1998.
Elder then presumes thai Birschbach must marshal all the evidence supporting this
finding in order to show that the court erred. However, even with respect to the common
law doctrines asserted at trial, the trial court made no such finding, and in fact expressly
rejected this argument. In its findings, the trial court stated as follows:
9. The Court finds that there was no novation, accord and satisfaction, or
waiver based upon the contractual terms of the agreement and the
meeting of the minds.
10. The Court finds that there was a new agreement based upon a
discussion between Mr. Birschbach and Mr. Rutherford whereby Mr.
Rutherford told Mr. Birschbach that Mr. Elder was no longer involved.
The new agreement stated that Mr. Birschbach and Mr. Rutherford
would continue together, without Mr. Elder, on the same terms as the
previous agreement; that there was a new term to the agreement as to
the opening of subsequent lots; that Mr. Birschbach accepted
Mr. Rutherford's position and did not attempt to contact Mr. Elder after
Mr. Elder left, which added to the court's finding of comparative
negligence.
11. The court also finds that Mr. Elder was not released of any
responsibility prior to August 31, 1998 and would be responsible for
damages from February 1998 to August 1998, that Mr. Elder signed a
note for one-half of the $21,600 owed to Garff Leasing, which shows
good faith in trying to resolve his debts.
12. The Court also finds that Mr. Elder was responsible for one-half of the
damages for the period of February 1998 to August 1998. . . .
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, f*[ 9-12,
Addendum 1 to ^Appellant's opening brief.)
As is evident from the above findings, the trial court did find that there was a new
agreement connected to Elder's withdrawal from the Elder/Rutherford Partnership.
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However, it is very clear from the written and oral findings that the court never found that
to be a basis for limiting the liability of Elder for debts existing at the time he withdrew
from the partnership. At trial Birschbach argued that Elder should be responsible for
obligations of the partnership even after he withdrew. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 333-334.) The
trial court found that there was a new agreement upon Elder's withdrawal from the
partnership and therefore Elder would not be liable for obligations incurred thereafter.
This is clear from the trial court's written as well as oral findings. In its oral findings, the
court stated as follows:
There has been a breach in that expenses have not been paid. Now, the
court does not find novation, does not find accord and satisfaction, does not
find waiver, and does not find those based on the contractual terms of
agreement and meeting of the minds. I agree.. .there's been no agreement
in the broadest sense as between and among Rutherford, Elder, and
Birschbach to release Elder of all of his responsibilities prior to August 31 st
of 1998. The court expressly finds, however, that he is not responsible for
anything after August 31st of 1998, that there was in fact a new agreement
and that was based upon the football field, practice football field
discussion....
(Id at p. 358, attached as Addendum 2 to Appellant's opening brief.)
It is true the trial court determined that Elder should be responsible for only onehalf of the damages owed to Birschbach that were incurred prior to Elder's departure at
the end of August 1998. The basis for the trial court's decision in that regard is not
completely clear. In Birschbach's opening brief, he challenges that conclusion on two
grounds. First, Birschbach asserts, based upon very clear law, that Elder, as a member of
the Elder/Rutherford Partnership, is liable for 100% of the Partnership's debts. Second,
Birschbach, in an attempt to exhaust any possible basis for the trial court's determination
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that Elder should be responsible for only one-half of the debt, addresses whether there is
evidence to support the argument that there was an agreement to release Elder for onehalf of the obligations that existed prior to August 31. 1998. Partial release of the predeparture debt is an argument that none of the parties made at trial. (Tr. at v. 1359
pp. 325-354; see also Birschbach's and Elder's proposed Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law7.) The only evidence that could even conceivably support the partial
release theory is the evidence related to the Garff bounced check. As addressed in
Birschbach's opening brief, that evidence falls far short of showing a partial reiease.
3. The evidence does not support the position that Elder was released
from liability for partnership obligations existing as of August 31,
1998 pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-33.
The trial court found that there was no agreement releasing Elder from partnership
obligations existing as of August 31, 1998. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order and Judgment *I*f Q -l 1, attached as Addendum 1 to Appellant's opening brief.)
In order to cnallenge this finding, Elder must "marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings."

Grayson Roper Limited

Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). Elder bears a heavy burden in
challenging factual issues because "appellate review is highly deferential, requiring
reversal only if a finding is clearly erroneous." Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939
P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
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In order to support his position, Elder focuses on the evidence related to his
departure from the partnership. This evidence, however, especially given the deferential
appellate standard of review, does not establish that Birschbach agreed to release Elder.
Both Birschbach and Elder testified about the circumstances surrounding Elder's
withdrawal from the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. Birschbach testified that he spoke
with Rutherford in late August 1998, and Rutherford told him that Elder was going to
withdraw from the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. Rutherford told Birschbach that the
business was down about five to ten thousand dollars. Birschbach understood this to
mean that the business had a balance sheet deficit of between five and ten thousand
dollars. Birschbach further testified that he agreed that Rutherford could continue to
operate the business by himself, and Rutherford further represented to Birschbach that he
believed he could make up the deficit. Birschbach also testified that he understood that
Rutherford would assume the obligations of the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. According
to Birschbach, he had no conversations with Elder about his departure from the business
until around November 1998. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 45-46, 92-99; see also Tr. at v. 1359
p. 256.)
Elder also testified about his departure from the business. Elder testified that he
informed Rutherford that he wanted to withdraw from the business. According to Elder,
his desire was to end the business and liquidate the inventory. However, Rutherford
informed Elder that he had spoken with Birschbach and Birschbach had agreed that
Rutherford could continue the business alone. According to Elder, Rutherford told him
that Rutherford would assume responsibility for outstanding debts and continue the
8537 02-10/14/03
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business. Elder testified that he closed an existing bank account and turned over the
funds to Rutherford. {Id. v. 1359 at pp. 248-256.) Elder appears to have recognized that
he did not obtain an agreement releasing him from liability, stating, "Obviously I should
have done things differently and I wouldn't be here.../' {Id. at p. 249.)
Elder concedes, as he must, that merely because he withdrew from the Partnership
does not change his liability for existing partnership debt.

(Elder's brief, p. 14.)

However, in reliance upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-33(2), Elder argues that the evidence
described above establishes that he and Birschbach entered into an agreement releasing or
discharging him from liability for existing debts of the Partnership.

This provision

provides as follows:
A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such
agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor
having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership
continuing the business.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-1-33(2). The trial court did not consider this statutory provision

at trial because it was not argued. However, the trial court did consider common law
release and waiver arguments, and after hearing all the evidence presented by Elder at
trial, rejected the assertion that there was a release or a waiver of Elder's liability predating his withdrawal from the Partnership. It was not clear error for the court to reject
Elder's argument.
The evidence at trial showed that Elder failed to even discuss the topic of his
departure with Birschbach until long after Elder had withdrawn from the business. It is
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very difficult for Elder to assert that he reached an agreement with Birschbach when he
failed to even communicate with Birschbach on the topic. In response to his counsel's
leading question, Elder testified as follows:
Q: And was it your understanding then that you had no responsibility for
the debts and liabilities?
A: Correct, from what I understood as Mr. Rutherford indicated that thev
would assume the responsibilities.
(Tr. at v. 1359 p. 250.) This is the only testimony that even implies any release of
liability, and it is based solely upon Elder's assumption, not upon express discussions
with either Birschbach or Rutherford concerning obtaining a release. Moreover, this
testimony doesn't even address whether Elder's understanding, as stated in the above
quoted testimony, related to debts incurred before or after his departure from the
business. After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found only that there was a
new agreement that Elder would not be liable for debts arising after he left the
Partnership.
It is clear from Elder's own testimony that he never directly discussed with
Rutherford, let alone Birschbach, the topic of whether Elder would be released from
existing Partnership liabilities. It appears that Elder at best merely presumed that he
would be released from liability for existing Partnership obligations because he was
withdrawing from the business and Rutherford assumed the obligations. However, the
mere fact that Elder left and Rutherford continued on his own does not require the
conclusion that Birschbach agreed to release Elder from existing partnership obligations.
It was well within Elder's rights to withdraw from the business, and Rutherford was free
8537 02-10/14/03
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to continue and assume Partnership obligations. However, the mere continuance of the
business by Rutherford and his assumption of Partnership obligations does not require the
conclusion that Birschbach agreed to grant Elder a release.

When ail reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of the trial court's findings that there was no novation,
waiver, accord and satisfaction, or release, the trial court's findings are easily sustainable.
There are also several other facts which dictate against such a release.
For example. Birschbach only agreed that Rutherford could continue the business
after Rutherford represented to him that the dealership's debts exceed its assets by only
five to ten thousand dollars at that time. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 45-46, 92-99.)

Since

Rutherford and Elder were partners at the time Rutherford made this representation
concerning the partnership's business, this representation is imputed to Elder. See

UTAH

CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-8, 48-1-9, and 48-1-10.l After hearing and weighing the evidence,
the trial court found that the business's deficit was actually $45,000. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp.
360-361, attached as Addendum 2 to Appellant's opening brief.)

Thus, Elder and

Rutherford misrepresented the dealership's deficit by approximately five to ten times at
the time Elder withdrew from the Partnership.
In addition, facts at trial show that prior to Elder's departure from the Partnership,
the Partnership incurred a debt of $21,600 to Garff Leasing.

After Elder left the

Partnership, he signed a promissory note in favor of Garff Leasing agreeing to pay a
portion of the debt. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 43-44.) If, as Elder now contends, there was an

1

The text of these provisions is included in full in Addendum A.
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agreement to release him from liability for debts existing at the time he left the
Elder/Rutherford Partnership, Elder would have had no reason to pay any of the Garff
Leasing debt. His willingness to do so completely undercuts his present assertion that
Birschbach granted him a release.
4. Elder was not released from liability for partnership debt arising prior
to his withdrawal from the partnership based upon UTAH CODE ANN.
§48-1-33(3).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-1-33(3) provides as follows:

Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved
partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be
discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who,
knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or
time of payment of such obligations.
Elder argues that this provision also releases him from liability for debts arising while he
was a part of the Partnership. In order to establish a release under this provision, Elder
must identify specific obligations for which he otherwise would be responsible and then
show that after he withdrew from the Partnership Birschbach agreed "to material
alterations in the nature or time of payment of such obligations."
It first of all should be noted that this again is an argument never made before the
trial court. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 339-354.) Elder should not be permitted to raise on appeal
arguments that he did not make at trial.
Moreover, Elder cannot show any obligations of the partnership that Birschbach
agreed to alter. Elder argues that Birschbach agreed to alter the terms of the $25,000 loan
he made to the partnership. The evidence, however, does not support this position.
Birschbach testified that in early June he borrowed $25,000 from Washington Mutual,
8537 02-10/14/03
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collateralized by a truck, and loaned the money to Elder and Rutherford.

The

Washington Mutual loan required payments of $500 a month. Elder and Rutherford were
going to use the $25,000 to acquire inventory, and they informed Birschbach that they
would pay the loan off in 30 to 60 days. Birschbach testified that 30 days later, when the
Partnership was supposed to pay off the loan, Elder and Rutherford told Birschbach they
would make the monthly payments because they wanted to use the money for another
30 days. According to Birschbach's testimony, after 30 more days elapsed, Elder and
Rutherford informed him that they still did not have the money to pay off the loan, and
they informed him that they would just continue making the monthly payments. (Tr. at v.
1358 pp. 37-40.) Mr. Birschbach testified as follows with respect to the loan:
Q:

After Mr. Elder left, that loan continued to be extended?

A:

Well not by choice.

(Id. at pp. 84-86.)
The above testimony with respect to the $25,000 loan falls far short of showing
that Birschbach materially altered an obligation of the Partnership after Elder withdrew
from the business. The evidence at best shows that after Elder withdrew from the
Partnership, the same pattern of defaulting on the agreement continued. There was no
agreement to extend or alter anything.
Elder also asserts that Birschbach agreed to a material alteration in an obligation
because Rutherford, with Birschbach's consent, opened a second retail car lot after Elder
left the Partnership. (Elder's brief, p. 18.) This assertion, however, misses the point
because Elder has no liability for any additional expense related to a rent obligation that
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arose after he left the business. Thus, opening a second lot did not materially alter an
obligation for which Elder is responsible. Section 48-1-33(3) does not prohibit a party
who has assumed partnership obligations from incurring additional expenses after the
withdrawal of a partner. This provision only relates to altering an obligation that existed
at the time a partner withdrew.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ELDER
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE
PARTNERSHIP'S DEBTS ARISING PRIOR TO ELDER'S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARTNERSHIP.
Elder withdrew from the Elder/Rutherford Partnership at the end of August 1998.
In its written findings, the trial court found:
11.

The court also finds that Mr. Elder was not released of any
responsibility prior to August 31, 1998 and would be responsible for
damages from February 1998 to August 1998, that Mr. Elder signed
a note for one-half of the $21,600 owed to Ken Garff Leasing, which
shows his good faith in trying to resolve his debts.

12.

The court also finds that Mr. Elder was responsible for one-half of
the damages for the period of February 1998 to August 1998....

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, <ffi 11, 12, attached
to Appellant's opening brief at Addendum 1.) Birschbach contends that the court erred in
concluding that Elder should be responsible for only one-half of the Partnership debt. In
his opening brief, Birschbach contends:

(1) The court erred as a matter of law in

concluding that Elder, as one of two partners in the Elder/Rutherford Partnership, should
be liable for only one-half of the Partnership's debts because partners are jointly liable for
all of a partnership's debts; and (2) in an effort to exhaust and address any potential basis
for the trial court's decision to impose liability for only one-half of the Partnership's
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debts, Birschbach contends that to the extent that the trial court's decision could be
construed to be based upon a partial release, there is no evidence to support such a
finding.
In point II of his brief, Elder contends that the trial court concluded that Eider
should be responsible for only one-half of the debt because of a new agreement or
novation. Elder asserts that there was a new agreement whereby Elder withdrew from :he
business and Rutherford continued alone. According to Elder, the intent of this new
agreement was that Elder would be discharged from responsibility. (Elder's brief, p. 20.)
As described in Section A above, Elder's arguments are very inconsistent with the
trial court's findings. The trial court expressly found "that there was no novation, accord
and satisfaction, or waiver." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and
Judgment, If 9, attached to Appellant's opening brief as Addendum 1.) The court further
found "that Mr. Elder was not released of any responsibility prior to August 31, 1998 and
would be responsible for damages from February 1998 to August 1998/' {Id. at«[ 11.)
The trial court did find that there was a new agreement whereby Elder withdrew from the
business. However, the only significance of this finding was that Elder would not be
responsible for the obligations that arose after he withdrew from the business. The most
persuasive reading of the trial court's written findings is that the court expressly rejected
the argument that there was a release of Elder's liability for debts arising prior to the time
he left the partnership. It appears that the trial court simply erred as a matter of law and
concluded that because Elder owned a fifty percent interest in the Partnership, he should
be liable for only fifty percent of its debts.
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Because the trial court expressly rejected the argument that there was a novation
that resulted in the release of Elder for the debts arising before he left the partnership, he
bears a heavy burden on appeal to establish that the trial court erred. He must marshal all
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the finding. Grayson
Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). Elder has not
and cannot meet this burden.
Moreover, in the context of novation, Utah law provides:
The burden of proof as to a novation by the transaction in question rests
upon the party who asserts it; ... and intention to effect a novation will not
be presumed; ... in the absence of evidence indicating a contrary intention,
it will be presumed, prima facie, that the new obligation was accepted
merely as additional or collateral security, or conditionally, subject to the
payment thereof; and that the intention to effect a novation must be clearly
shown.
First American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1195
(Utah 1987) (quoting DA. Taylor Company v. Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Utah
1976)).
Elder's argument in favor of novation is simply that Elder withdrew from the
partnership and Rutherford agreed to assume partnership obligations and continue with
the business. Elder asks that from these facts it be inferred that the intent was that he be
released from obligations existing at the time he withdrew from the business. However,
Utah law presumes just to the contrary, and Elder cannot show that a new agreement was
put in place with the intention of releasing him from responsibility for existing
partnership debts.
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Moreover, Elder's argument has nothing to do with the trial court's conclusion
that he should be liable only for one-half of the Partnership's debt. The only evidence
before the trial court that could even remotely be construed to support a partial-release of
Elder's responsibility for Partnership debts is the facts related to the Garff Leasing debt.
In his opening brief, Birschbach marshals all of the evidence with respect to the Garff
Leasing debt and demonstrates that the conclusion of partial-release is unsupportable.
Elder offers little argument to the contrary, arguing only that the trial court's
determination that Elder should be responsible for only one-half of the damages was not
based upon the Garff Leasing debt. (Elder's brief p. 19.) Elder may well be correct
inasmuch as he never argued for a partial release at trial on any grounds. (Tr. at v. 1359
pp. 339-350.)

If Elder is correct, then there is no evidence whatsoever to support the

conclusion that Elder should be responsible for one-half of the Partnership's obligations.
C. THE TRL\L COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT ELDER
BREACHED THE CONTRACT,
The trial court found that Birschbach entered into a contract with the
Elder/Rutherford Partnership. The court found that the contract required, among other
things, that Birschbach allow the Partnership to use his dealership license and that the
Partnership pay the expenses of operating the dealership.

(Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, <[ 2, attached to Appellant's opening brief
as Addendum 1.) The trial court also found that there was a breach of the contract in that
expenses were not paid. (Id. at f 8.) In order to challenge this finding, Elder is required
to marshal the evidence that supports the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence,
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including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, cannot support the finding.
Elder makes no attempt to do so and indeed concedes that at the time he withdrew from
the Partnership "the duties and obligations called for under the contract were satisfied,
except some expenses had not been paid." (Elder's brief, p. 23.) Elder, however, goes on
to argue that there is a legal excuse for his failure to pay expenses in that a new
agreement was entered into that resulted in his release. He asserts, therefore, that the trial
court erred in finding that he breached the agreement. For the reasons set forth above,
there was no new agreement resulting in the release of Elder, and this argument lacks
merit.
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT DAMAGES
WERE CAPABLE OF DETERMINATION.
In point V of his brief, Elder asserts that there was not sufficient evidence before
the trial court to make a reasonable approximation of damages.

Elder asserts that

damages were awarded to Birschbach based upon speculation and nothing more than "a
guess." (Elder's brief, p. 25.) However, there was more than adequate evidence before
the trial court based upon which the court could reasonably approximate damages.
Utah law provides that where there is evidence of damage, a defendant may not
escape liability on the grounds that damages cannot be proven with precision, and the
wrongdoer must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Bastion v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956
(Utah 1983); see also Atkin Wright & Miles v. The Mountain State Telephone and
Telegraph Company, 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985); Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick
Sales and Service, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983); Promax Development Corp. v.
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Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (cert, denied 953 P.2d 489 (Utah
1997)).

The trial court had more than adequate evidence before it from which to

determine damages.
The following evidence and approaches to damages were presented to the trial
court:
1.

Birschbach called an accountant as an expert witness to testify about

damages. Birschbach's expert, Macey Buker, testified that he attempted to identify
transactions that met all of the following criteria: 1) vehicles which were purchased by
the dealership prior to Elder's withdrawal; 2) vehicles that were resold by the dealership
before Elder withdrew from the partnership; 3) vehicles for which Birschbach ultimately
paid because the Partnership had failed to do so. Plaintiffs expert testified that he was
able to definitely identify $48,635.13 in transactions meeting all of these criteria. He also
testified that he could identify transactions totaling $91,466.80 for which there was
inadequate information to determine with certainty whether or not the transactions met all
of these criteria. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 140-153, 161-65; Tr. at v. 1359 p. 324; Buker
Report, Plaintiffs Exhibit P-9 and Schedules A and C thereto.)
2.

Birschbach also testified that he was ultimately required to pay $220,000 to

satisfy debts left to him through the irresponsible operation of the dealership by Elder and
Rutherford.

(Tr. at v. 1359 p. 219.) The trial court apparently did not choose this

calculation of damages because it concluded that Elder should not be liable for events
arising after he left the partnership.
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3.

Jeffrey Jenson, an accountant and Elder's expert witness, testified that the

balance sheet deficit for the Elder/Rutherford Partnership as of the time Elder withdrew
from the partnership was $35,105.61. {Id. at p. 294; Defendant's Exhibit D-13.) Jenson
further testified that there was an error factor in his analysis and that he would estimate
the range of the negative balance sheet figure for the Partnership as of that time to be
between $25,000 and $50,000. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 297-99.) The trial court adopted this
measure of damages, and fixed the deficit within the range supported by Jenson's
testimony. The trial court determined that the balance sheet deficit as of August 31, 1998
was $45,000. {See trial court's oral findings, Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 354-361, attached to
Appellant's opening brief as Addendum 2.)
4.

Elder's expert also testified that at the time Elder withdrew from the

Partnership, the Partnership's total debts were $130,328.60. (Tr. at v. 1359 p. 295;
Defendant's Exhibit D-13.) At trial, Birschbach's counsel argued that this should be the
measure of damages because the contract between Birschbach and the Partnership was
that the Partnership would pay the expenses from the operation of the dealership. {Id. at
p. 327.) Elder presented no testimony concerning whether these debts were paid before
Birschbach shut the business down approximately six to eight weeks later.
The trial court's damage calculations were not based upon speculation or guess.
Although both experts testified that there was some uncertainty in the financial
information due to the disarray of the records, the experts were able to derive reasonable
conclusions based on the evidence they reviewed.

The experts presented various

calculations from which damages could be determined by the court. The wide variance
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in the dollar figures was dictated by the differing methodologies used by the experts and
the parties to calculate the damages, and is not evidence, as Elder suggests, that damages
could be ascertained only by speculation.
The trial court found that Elder breached his contract with Birschbach, resulting in
damages. In these circumstances, any uncertainty with respect to the calculation of
damages must be borne by Elder, and the trial court properly determined that damages
could be reasonably calculated.
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING DAMAGES BASED
UPON THE PARTNERSHIPS BALANCE SHEET DEFICIT.
Elder argues that the trial court properly determined that damages should be based
upon the Partnership's balance sheet deficit at the time he left the Partnership. He argues
that this is the proper method of calculating damages because he turned the business over
to Rutherford, including its money, inventory and other assets. He contends that if the
balance sheet deficit is not the measure of damages, then he will be "deprived of any
opportunity to apply his interest in partnership assets against the liabilities.'' (Elder's
brief p. 26).
Elder's argument is wrong for several reasons. First, and most importantly, the
measure of damages adopted by the trial court ignores the terms of the contract made by
the parties. The measure of damages should be based upon the contract. Utah case law
provides that an aggrieved party in a breach of contract case is entitled to recover the
benefit of his bargain, or in other words "the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching
party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed." Young Electric Sign
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Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) (quoting Alexander v.
Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (1982)).
In the present case, the contract in question required the Elder/Rutherford
Partnership to pay the debts incurred in the operation of the dealership. It is undisputed
that the Partnership breached the agreement and failed to do so. The undisputed evidence
is that Birschbach closed the dealership down within two months of Elder's departure
from the business, and ultimately had to pay expenses of $220,000 that had been incurred
through the operation of the business. The trial court determined that Elder should only
be responsible for obligations incurred prior to his departure from the business, and
Birschbach does not challenge that determination on appeal. Elder's own expert fixed the
amount of debt owed by the dealership when he withdrew from the business at
$130,328.60. Clearly, in order for Birschbach to have the benefit of his bargain, he must
be awarded judgment for the expenses incurred by the Partnership prior to the time Elder
left the business.
If Elder believed part of the debt was subsequently paid by someone other than
Birschbach, he had ever opportunity to present evidence to establish his affirmative
defense of payment. He failed to present any such evidence. Moreover, it is unlikely that
he could do so inasmuch as the undisputed evidence shows that within only a couple of
months, the debt with which Birschbach was saddled grew to $220,000. Birschbach is
entitled to a judgment that gives him the benefit of his bargain, and the trial court erred in
only rendering judgment based upon the net balance sheet deficit.
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F. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ELDER'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF BIRSCHBACH'S CASE IN
CHIEF,
Elder argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of Birschbach's presentation of evidence. Elder argues that the
trial court erred because Birschbach failed to present adequate evidence of damages
during his case in chief.
Elder carries a very heavy burden to show that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict. Utah law requires that
u

a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very difficult burden of
showing that no evidence exists that raises a question of material fact." If
there is any evidence raising a question of material fact, judgment as a
matter of law is improper. Thus, a motion for a directed verdict is "only
appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the
evidence presented." When considering a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party moved against; however. "'the court is not free to weigh the evidence
and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge
the facts.v
Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah 1999) (citaiions omitted) (quoting Alta
Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
and Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-898 (Utah 1982)).
At trial, Birschbach's expert offered testimony concerning Birschbach's damages.
Based upon various legal theories, Birschbach also sought to recover $220,000,
representing the undisputed total amount of expenses from operating the dealership that
Birschbach ultimately was forced to pay. That testimony is outlined in section D, above.
When the deferential standard that applies to motions for a directed verdict is applied to
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this evidence, it is clear the court correctly determined to deny Elder's motion for a
directed verdict.

It would have been impossible for the trial court to grant the motion

without weighing the evidence. The trial court could not have possibly granted the
motion in light of the standard that requires that all the evidence be viewed in the light
most favorable to Birschbach.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's determination that Birschbach did not
agree to release Elder for debts arising prior to his withdrawal from the Partnership.
This Court should reverse the trial court with respect to its determination that
Elder is liable only for one-half of the Elder/Rutherford Partnership obligations arising
prior to Elder's withdrawal from the business.
This Court should reverse the trial court's determination to calculate damages
based upon the dealership's net balance sheet deficit as of August 31, 1998. This Court
should reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor
of Plaintiffs for $130,328.60, which figure represents the outstanding debt of the
dealership as of August 31, 1998 as determined by Elder's own expert.
DATED this J ^ j f d a y of October, 2003.
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS

STEVEJJ G/LOOSLE

Attorneys for Appellants
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day of October. 2003, to the following:

ADDENDUM

Tab A

C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 154.

48-1-8. Partnership bound by admission of partner.
An admission or representation made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within the
scope of his authority as conferred by this chapter is evidence against the partnership.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 11; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-8.
Cross-References. - Party admission, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 754 to 757, 939.
C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 167.
48-1-9. Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice to partner.
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the
partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his mind, and
the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and should have communicated it to
the acting partner, operates as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of a
fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 12; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-9.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 252 to 256.
C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 175.
48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act.
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable
therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 13; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-10.
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partnership engaged in carrying on business.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 35; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-32.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 936 to 961.
C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354 to 362.
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability.

(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liability of any
partner.
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an
agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or partnership
continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between
the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the
business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, the
partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to any
creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the
nature or time of payment of such obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for those obligations of the
partnership incurred while he was a partner and for which the partner was liable under Section
48-1-12, but subject to the prior payment of his separate debts.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 36; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-33; L. 1994, ch. 61, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis

Assumption of obligations.
Cited.
Assumption of obligations.
Under this statute there must be an assumption of liability by a third person of the partnership
obligation if the partners are to be discharged of their liabilities. Thus where a creditor of a dissolving
partnership consented to an arrangement whereby the purchaser of the partnership was to pay him the
money owing to the dissolving partnership, but the purchaser had never assumed the liabilities of the
partnership, the creditor could obtain judgment against the dissolving partnership when the purchaser
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